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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [PHUM](#) [MOPS](#) [KPKO](#) [RW](#) [CG](#)  
SUBJECT: UN/DPA ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL MEETING WITH  
LOCAL P3AND2 REPS

REF: A. KINSHASA 1251

- [1](#)B. KINSHASA 1252
- [1](#)C. KINSHASA 1264
- [1](#)D. KIGALI 1019
- [1](#)E. KIGALI 1022
- [1](#)F. KIGALI 1026

Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D)

[1](#)1. (C) Summary. UN/DPA Assistant Secretary General Haile Menkerios met with local representatives of the P3and2 to brief them on his new mandate, recent discussions in Kinshasa, Goma, and meetings with Rwandan officials. Rwanda and the DRC needed to reach common understandings on security issues in the Kivus, and an attempt would be made to do so at side meetings at the International Conference of the Great Lakes in Nairobi. President Kabila accepted the concept of simultaneous operations against the FDLR and General Nkunda, and Menkerios had tasked MONUC to determine what resources were needed to do so. While President Kabila misunderstood the dynamics of the Kivus, he accepted that his military strategy needed broadening to include diplomatic and political initiatives. Differences between Rwanda and the DRC could be bridged, and a workable plan constructed. End summary.

[1](#)2. (C) Menkerios said he is working to get the Rwandese and Congolese to: 1) achieve a common understanding between Rwanda and Congo on the analysis of the problem; 2) agree on tools, mandates and resources necessary to deal with the situation in North Kivu; and 3) obtain necessary UNSC approval to take action. He said Rwanda and Congo needed to reach a common plan to address the situation in North Kivu. Kabila had agreed to a package approach that includes dealing simultaneously with the FDLR and General Nkunda, which greatly facilitated the prospect for progress (most stakeholders agreed to the simultaneous strategy, he added). He noted, however, that the Congolese ruled out any joint DRC-Rwandan operation against the FDLR and ruled out any formal negotiations with Nkunda. Menkerios said he had stressed to the Congolese that a military solution alone would not achieve the desired results and that both a political strategy and military plan was needed. He told President Kabila that MONUC will not move against Nkunda except when civilians are threatened.

[1](#)3. (C) Menkerios underscored that Nkunda is a "phenomena," while the FDLR is the root cause of insecurity in eastern DRC. Dealing with the FDLR problem will also effectively deal with Nkunda. Menkerios noted that the inability of the Congolese military to deal with Nkunda coupled with the government's demonization of Nkunda has resulted in a highly charged political situation that has negatively affected Kabila's popular support and gravely increased ethnic tensions. He stressed the dire situation in North Kivu

required immediate results to de-escalate the situation and provide space for further dialogue with Nkunda (without violating Kabila's ban on negotiations). He underscored the credibility gap that Kabila carries, saying, "he promises everything, but delivers nothing" and stressed "Congo remains a state in the making." However, Menkerios commented, it is wrong to suggest that the DRC is arming the FDLR. Rather, he underscored, members of the armed forces appear to be involved in arming the FDLR.

¶4. (C) Menkerios said President Kabila was not receiving accurate information, and as a result misunderstood the current dynamics in the Kivus. Kabila had weak control over his government, and the administrative apparatus was "chaotic." However, Kabila now understood that his military strategy against Nkunda had been unsuccessful. Regarding war crimes and other offenses in the Kivus, Kabila had moved against abusive officers, Menkerios asserted, but did not do so in a systematic manner.

¶5. (C) Menkerios told the gathered diplomats that he had tasked the MONUC Force commander to answer the question: what additional force is required to carry out a simultaneous military strategy that deals with both FDLR and Nkunda? Menkerios stressed that it is impossible to say at this time what is needed to bolster the capacity of MONUC and FARDC to deal with both Nkunda and FDLR concurrently. For example, MONUC knew the location of FDLR command and control centers, and could move against them. Special operations against FDLR leadership were also needed. These would need to be carefully coordinated. Rwandan officials had told him that if the FDLR launched attacks on Rwanda, Rwanda would respond. This needed to be prevented.

¶6. (C) According to Menkerios, Rwanda believes the international community does not have the will to solve the problem and that UN Security Council action is required. He noted that Rwanda's response to the Congolese FDLR plan was a list of maxims and could be further negotiated and a compromise found. For example, Rwanda did not want FDLR personnel relocated anywhere in the DRC. However, once disarmed, could they be considered noncombatants and moved within the Congo? Bridging the differences was not insurmountable, and he added that he will host the GOR and GDRC Foreign Ministers at a side meeting at the International Conference on the Great Lakes on Friday, November 9, 2007. He noted that the Senior Adviser Shortley and EU Special Envoy Roland Van der Geer will also be present, and said the UN Secretary General had asked Menkerios to work closely with the U.S. as well as other stakeholders.

ARIETTI